HUMAN RESOURCES TRANSFORMATION: PSDR FIVE YEARS LATER

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14. ABSTRACT

As Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom were fought, the Army transformed its division-centric force to a more agile and deployable brigade-centric force. Simultaneously, the Army's Human Resources (HR) community restructured Army HR assets to support the brigade-centric Army. Five years after redesigning Army HR support, this research assesses whether Personal Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) accomplished its intended purpose. An examination of the HR Structure Requirement Code (SRC) 12 structure reveals PSDR supported Army transformation and GWOT, but the HR community must implement changes to balance the levels of effort and HR assets in brigade, division, corps and echelons above corps HR teams in a theater of operation. This study further recommends developing successful PSDR organizations and supports recent initiatives by the Adjutant General's School to build reasonable expectations within the Army. Most important, this assessment identifies the Army's lack of a strategic level HR sustainment training program to improve PSDR within Army units and recommends implementing a Mobile Training Team (MTT) solution. As a result, the HR community should aggressively pursue HR support and doctrinal changes for the future.

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HUMAN RESOURCES TRANSFORMATION: PSDR FIVE YEARS LATER

Some military senior leaders often quote the first Special Operations truth, "Humans are more important than hardware," when referring to how important people are to the Department of Defense (DOD).[1] Today, one would be hard pressed to find a leader who does not fully support the human dimension focus within DOD or the systems and programs the services use to support their military personnel. Likewise, while the United States military engaged in its first war of the twenty-first century, the Army also transformed its force to a modular, brigade-centric organizational structure which impacted combat units as well as logistics and support organizations. As a result Human Resources (HR) leaders responded to Army transformation efforts by creating a concept of human resources support called Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR). Now entering into its sixth year, PSDR was specifically designed to provide personnel services support to a modular, brigade-centric Army.[2] This means the Army's HR community was implementing PSDR as units deployed in support of the Global War on Terror.[3] The Army's former G-1, LTG Michael Rochelle wrote that:

> PSDR is the Human Resources (HR) community's response to Army transformation. It impacts how we support our Soldiers in the operational force. It is a revolution in how we deliver support. It is the most significant change in our business we have seen in our careers.[4]

Therefore, given that Army organizations have been using PSDR, it is appropriate for strategic leaders of the Army to review the first five years of implementation and determine whether PSDR is providing commanders and units' personnel services support as it was designed? Perhaps one answer is that senior leaders who implemented PSDR did the best they could during a challenging time and accomplished many positive steps during the transformation of the Army's Human

Resources (HR) support. Then again, the Army's HR community, led primarily by Adjutant General's Corps (AG) professionals (civilians, officers and enlisted Soldiers) must still refine and PSDR to continue to improve HR support to the Army for the future.

This assessment of PSDR relied primarily on interviews and discussions with Army HR professionals. This is because the changes to personnel services support brought about by PSDR lacked documented analysis about lessons learned and challenges encountered by HR professionals providing HR support during GWOT.

Research into the development and implementation of PSDR led to assessments of five areas. The first area is administrative in nature because senior HR leaders did not write and capture HR lessons learned. The other four areas are PSDR specific and involve the organizational structures supporting PSDR, the individual HR tasks supporting PSDR, the training (individual, collective and sustainment) required to execute PSDR, and how the Adjutant General's Corps and HR doctrine supports PSDR. In each area, analysis was based on whether Army senior leaders planned and implemented PSDR as designed. In some areas the answer is yes. In other areas, the Army's HR community has work to do. Regardless, the groundwork is now laid.

Capturing PSDR Lessons Learned

An overall observation found that there is a lack of documented lessons learned and writings by senior HR professionals (Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels) about how Army leaders implemented and conducted PSDR at the division, corps and theater levels, even though junior HR professionals (Lieutenants to Majors, Warrant Officers and Noncommissioned Officers) are writing about their experiences at the battalion and brigade levels. For example, S-1 Net offers over 130 detailed comments posted by noncommissioned officers and junior officers concerning the successes and pitfalls of

PSDR at the battalion and brigade levels.[5] In addition, the United States Army

Command and General Staff College awarded a Masters of Military Arts and Sciences

degree to a student who published a paper on the impacts of PSDR within a Brigade

Combat Team (BCT).[6] The Adjutant General's School (AGS) at the Soldier Support

Institute continues to teach PSDR, and until recently, primarily focused on S-1 skills

during the initial years of PSDR implementation.[7] Also, during visits to the classroom,

senior AG Corps leaders further emphasized the concepts of PSDR by facilitating

discussions about the importance of the brigade and battalion S-1 roles on unit staffs.[8]

However, finding a documented account written by a senior HR leader (Lieutenant

Colonel or above) about the impacts and implementation of PSDR at the division and

higher levels was almost impossible. Therefore, it appears the majority of senior AG

professionals are not documenting PSDR findings and lessons learned at the division,

corps, and theater levels.[9]

In order to address this disparity, the Commandant of the Adjutant General's

School (AGS) recently asked senior leaders to write articles about Adjutant General

Corps topics and personnel services support issues for publication in *1775,* the HR

community's professional magazine.[10] This approach should encourage senior leaders

to capture their experiences with PSDR at the operational and strategic levels while

making distribution to a wide range of HR professionals. Recent topics included the use

of the Army Bands in the PSDR environment, the Army National Guard and Army

Reserve transition to PSDR, and the current professional development track for an HR

professional (officer, warrant officer, enlisted).[11] The AG School Commandant's request

should positively impact the development of the Adjutant General's Corps professionals and the HR community.

Organizational HR Structure to Support PSDR

The HR structure of organizations to provide personnel services support within the Army was the foremost concern addressed during the development of the PSDR concept. During separate interviews and discussions, Army HR leaders were asked whether the HR structure at the battalion and brigade level was adequate. Generally responses were positive and indicated HR structure at the battalion and brigade level was appropriate to support the PSDR concept.[12] However, one caveat emerged about the lack of an automated and integrated HR system.

To support PSDR's structure a significant number of HR professionals highlighted the inability of the Department of the Army (DA) to field an integrated comprehensive personnel management information system.[13] Leaders' responses at all levels agreed that the Army's inability to field the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) had a negatively impacted on the organizational structure, workload and manning of HR Soldiers at the battalion and brigade levels. A key premise of PSDR was that when Department of Defense (DOD) and Headquarters, Department of Army (HQDA) fielded an HR information system, users of battalion and brigade level HR systems would be staffed, though not trained, to accomplish their assigned tasks and HR responsibilities.[14] However, DOD and HQDA did not field DIMHRS, and many HR leaders think that until the Army implements an integrated HR information management system to support automated Personnel Information Management (PIM), Strength Reporting (SR), Personnel Accountability (PA), and

Personnel Readiness Management (PRM),[15] that brigade and battalion S-1 sections will remain undermanned.[16]

In addition, senior HR leaders expressed significant concerns about PSDR's HR structures designed for providing personnel services at the division, corps and theater level of operations. These echelons of support above division level include the division G-1, corps G-1, ASCC G-1/AG, HRSC (Human Resources Sustainment Center) and the HR Company.[17] When asked about the value of the HRSC and the HR Company, two separate and opposed camps emerged. As defined in doctrine, the mission of the HRSC:

> Provides HR technical support to the TSC (Theater Support Command) Cdr/SPO (Commander/Support Operations Officer) and the Army Service Component Command G-1 and technical guidance to the HR Ops Cells in the ESCs and Sustainment Brigades. Plans, integrates and coordinates execution of external HR operations supporting theater forces especially in the areas of postal, R5 operations, and personnel accountability and strength reporting.[18]

Interpretation of After Action Review (AAR) comments revealed that HRSC Directors and HRSC staffs believed the doctrinal definition is achievable and the structures within the personnel community are functional but not optimal. However, AAR comments and interviews with Soldiers who served in a deployed HRSC indicated they thought the HRSC was misused and misunderstood.[19] "The field does not know what we do"[20] was a recurring reminder that HRSC missions, responsibilities and structure were not well understood. Also, comments about the HRSC's responsibilities in garrison showed a greater lack of understanding of the HRSC's mission.

Further widening this gap in perspectives occurred when the HRSC deployed in theater of operation during GWOT, division and corps G-1 staffs often asked about the role of the theater level HRSC and questioned how the HRSC should support them. In

some cases, principle HR staff officers in the HRSC could not identify how the HRSC supported the end user.[21] One AAR comment questioned whether the cost of the HRSC equals or surpasses the value of the HRSC.[22] In the eyes of some, the cost of the HRSC surpassed its value. Additionally, some thought the HR Company and HRSC's resources (structure and people) would provide a better return on investment and improve HR support at the theater level if the HR Company and HRSC resources were moved to the division and corps G-1 staffs.[23]

To answer whether the cost of the HRSC exceeds its value requires more analysis than currently available and provided here. However, it is clear HR leaders identified an HR structure issue requiring further study. The preponderance of the AAR information from division and corps G-1 staffs indicated the HR Company and HRSC were over structured and over resourced for their missions and functions.[24] As a result, division and corps G-1 leaders suggested redistributing HR Company and HRSC assets to division and corps staffs to augment personnel support within tactical and operational units when needed. Not surprisingly, HR professionals of the HRSC thought their missions were misunderstood and their resources improperly utilized by theater sustainment planners and supported commanders. As a result, HRSC leaders proposed the HR and sustainment communities achieve the same level of training and education about theater level personnel support missions as unit S-1s are trained on battalion and brigade HR missions.[25]

To understand the role of the HRSC's structure under PSDR, it is important to review the Structure Requirement Code (SRC) 12 structure in the HR Company and the HRSC.[26] Additionally, a review must consider the possibility that the HR community

over-modularized HR organizations when building structure. That's why decision makers should understand the rationale for developing the initial HRSC and HR Company structure.

As senior HR leaders developed the PSDR concept, many wanted to protect HR structure to ensure enough resources were available to accomplish HR missions during wartime operations.[27] One way HR leaders thought they could protect HR structure under SRC-12 was by placing the HR functions in a separate line item in accordance with Force Management principles, which would conceptually protect HR specific force structure when the Army is asked to provide bill payers for future resource cuts. In theory, when a headquarters (HQ) element is asked to cut structure, the amount cut in the G-1 would be less under the current conditions because the structure is assigned outside the HQ staff and in a separate SRC. The counter to this argument could be that the cost of removing a specific HR billet from the structure is not worth the value of the billet. Some in the HR community could make a good case that when Soldiers are performing critical missions and are seen as adding value, their positions may not be cut as a way to find bill payers for structure.

Figures 1 to 3 depict the limited structure of the brigade, division and corps HR cells.

Figure 1: Brigade S-1 Structure.

Figures 2 and 3 capture the proposed Division HR Cells and Corps HR Cells.

The concept of a modularized or "plug and play" Casualty Liaison Team (CLT) is shown

in the deployed augmentation block at the bottom of the figure.

Figure 2: Division HR Cell with CLT Augmentation.

Figure 3: Corps HR Cell with CLT Augmentation.

Figure 4 depicts e Personnel Services Support SRC-12 structures under PSDR.

Figure 4: SRC-12 Support under the PSDR concept.

However, if HR leaders decide to retain the HR structure and organizations separate from the division and corps G-1 staffs, then HR leaders still must consider how they would provide HR services to supported units and Soldiers. This means understanding the task organization and command relationships of the supported units.

Experience shows that when the value of the HR Soldier stands on its own, the Army's force developers will retain HR structure and positions in a division and corps HQ element. However, to compromise and save HR positions some fear may be lost; HR leaders should examine habitual relationships with supported units. Attaching SRC-12 structures of a HR Company (Figure 4) and creating a habitual relationship with a division or corps staff can overcome two critical concerns about the loss of HR structure. First, creating a habitual support relationship retains the HR force structure separate from the division and corps HQ elements, and second, it supports a division G-1's concern about training HR elements in supported unit SOPs prior to deployment.

Changing habitual support relationships from a force structure perspective has two positive results. The first positive force structure result is the ability to retain a small HR force structure in the division and corps G-1s. This keeps the potential of force structure bill payers to a minimum in the HR force structure. The second force structure result is passive and results in not having to defend an untenable position of perceived growth. If the structure were to move to the division and corps staffs, senior leaders may not understand the "perceived growth" of the HR staff in a time of "limited and diminishing resources." The attachment of HR force structure would eliminate the perception of "growth" in the HQ staffs.

Using attachment orders to attach HR organizations also overcomes the training concerns of the division and corps HR staff elements. For example, attaching a CLT to a Division G-1 as the Senior HR staff professional creates a habitual support relationship which provides the division G-1 and the corps G-1 the ability to assess and train the HR support team prior to deployment. Currently the modularized "plug and

play" HR teams are arriving in theater with the correct doctrinal skills. What the CLTs

are missing is a positive working relationship with the division and corps G-1 staffs and

an understanding of the deployed unit's Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). Using

attachment orders thus supports the senior HR staff professional's ability to "build the

team" prior to arriving in a theater of operations could be overcome by the SRC-12

attachment with a habitual relationship concept. The Adjutant General of the Army

drives home the point when he states "You do not have to own it to influence it."[28]

Human Resources (HR) Tasks Supporting PSDR

Because of manning and training concerns associated with the implementation of

PSDR, the Adjutant General School's (AGS) senior leaders decided to assess the HR

tasks performed by the HR community. The AGS used the Army's doctrinal approach

of the Critical Task Site Selection Board (CTSSB)[29] to capture and analyze the HR tasks

required to field a professional HR force.[30] This CTSSB was the first comprehensive

"bottom to top" analysis of HR training since the implementation of PSDR.[31] In general,

the CTSSB analysis of HR tasks originally validated by the developers of PSDR showed

that the initial tasks to be performed were close, but not entirely correct. The two

products of the CTSSB process resulted in a list of expectations by grade for an HR

professional and identified the critical tasks by grade an HR professional must be able

to perform.

The results of the CTSSB narrowed the PSDR expectation gap. This gap was

created when senior leaders emphasized the positive attributes of PSDR but did not

mention the inherent limitations of having a limited pool of professional HR Soldiers to

perform HR functions, did not plan to conduct HR sustainment training, and agreed to

an HR concept built on information technology that was not available.[32] The first five

years of PSDR resulted in confusion and a wide range of unrealistic expectations from commanders.

Despite these challenges, the CTSSB's first product generated a list of well defined expectations of HR professionals by grade. For example, the expectations of a Warrant Officer One (WO-1) following graduation from the Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) included:

> an in depth understanding of HR doctrine [and an ability to articulate HR concepts to other leaders], a thorough understanding of EPS, [a] basic understanding of the Military Decision Making Process, [a] confident HR professional with a comprehensive understanding of HR systems, [and a] (Subject Matter Expert) SME in HR capabilities at the Brigade level.[33]

Expectations of Adjutant General's Corps Lieutenants graduating the Basic Officers Leaders Course (BOLC) include the ability to:

> have a basic knowledge of the process and procedures, know where to look for the answers; have research abilities, not be an expert but understand the process of the Military Decision Making Process, and know how to use HR systems.[34]

The expectations of a Captain graduating the AG Captain's Career Course are the same as those of a Lieutenant but adds, "the capability of performing plans and operations functions" while being the HR functional expert in the area of responsibility.[35] The CTSSB used progressive reasoning to further develop Major's expectations by stating a Major is "a master of HR MDMP…be able to speak HR operations with sustainment and combat arms staffs."[36] Similarly, the enlisted analysis of expectations was a progressive and sequential list of expectations identified by enlisted grades which provided the Army and senior HR leaders with a target of what right looked like for enlisted HR professionals.[37]

The second CTSSB product was a breakout by grades of the critical tasks performed by HR professionals. This supported the final report's conclusion that given changes in HR doctrine and the transformation to PSDR, the HR tasks required to successfully implement PSDR had to significantly change. For example, Lieutenants started with 26 required tasks and after the CTSSB analyzed the tasks ended with only 18 HR tasks required to be considered proficient as a HR professional.

Officer	Start	End
Lieutenant	26	18
Captain	16	8
Major	20	8
Total	52	34

Figure 5: Commissioned Officer CTSSB Results.

The most significant changes in HR critical tasks appeared in the enlisted ranks. The HR enlisted aggregate tasks grew by 32 new critical tasks primarily due to merging the Military Occupational Specialty 71L Administrative specialist series (performing administrative and clerical duties) and the depth of technical expertise required of a Soldier serving in the newly coded 42 series (performing personnel support services such as processing Soldier awards, evaluations, promotion applications, legal paperwork, financial and pay transactions and personnel actions to support Soldiers professional and career development).

Enlisted	Start	End
Skill Level 1	28	28
Skill Level 2	0	2
Skill Level 3	20	33
Skill Level 4	18	29
Skill Level 5	0	5
Total	66	97

Figure 6: Enlisted Soldier CTSSB Results.

Warrant officers aggregate HR tasks decreased by 11.[38] This change was significant because it pared down CTSSB tasks for the newly appointed WO1 and CW2. This reduction enabled a new HR professional to focus on critical skills and work on depth of expertise in the Brigade S-1 vice the former breadth of knowledge expected of an Adjutant General Warrant Officer prior to PSDR.

Warrant	Start	End
WO1/CW2	25	18
CW3/CW4	11	7
Total	36	25

Figure 7: Warrant Officer CTSSB Results.

However, the numbers alone do not provide a thorough analysis of the new tasks. A comprehensive analysis led board members to conclude that the results are an accurate road ahead for the continued professionalism of the HR community. The recommended changes to the HR critical tasks should be prioritized and HR lesson plans at the AG School updated to reflect critical task changes. As the changes to lesson plans are made, senior HR leaders must educate the force on reasonable expectations of a successful PSDR organization. Often unit commanders expect the

Adjutant General School to produce a Soldier with the skills of a senior Captain or an HR Warrant Officer (420) to perform the duties of a junior officer or enlisted soldier. This misperception could be overcome with HR senior leaders setting the conditions for reasonable expectations by educating unit commanders.

Training Recommended to Sustain PSDR

With the migration of tasks from the legacy Personnel Services Battalions (PSB)[39] to the battalion and brigade S-1s under PSDR, training the HR force on the new HR tasks became a critical concern in implementing PSDR. So the fourth area of this assessment addresses training associated with PSDR. For this study's purpose, training includes individual, collective and sustainment training. The Army G-1's PSDR implementation plan included both individual and collective training; however the plan did not take into account sustainment training.[40]

The HQDA order implementing PSDR identified multiple phases.[41] Phase one was the pilot program conducted at the 101st Airborne Division in 2004 and 2005.[42] Phase two (General Guidance) stated that Forces Command was responsible for "multi-level certification" for transitioning and deployment status assessment.[43] The warning order also tasked the New Organization Training Team (NOTT) to initiate PSDR training.[44] The NOTT was given nine to eleven months to implement PSDR per BCT, with up to four months for coordination, one month for training and reset and up to six months for operational validation and certification.[45] The NOTT supported the Army's Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and took into account new soldier tasks, and unit Modified Tables of Organizations (MTOE). The NOTT de-conflicted all training and supported the Army's required conversion date of no later than 30 September 2008.[46]

Overall, the Army's NOTT training went well. The ability of the senior HR leaders to educate Army commanders and leaders during pre-site visits played an important part in obtaining senior leader support.[47] The installation level pre-site visits familiarized unit commanders with the PSDR concept and provided the information necessary to properly plan and resource the NOTT training. The visits also provided unit commanders and senior HR leaders on installations the ability to manage HR talent[48] within supported units. AAR comments confirmed that in locations where commanders and staffs took a proactive approach and balanced personnel resources, the training and implementation of PSDR went smoother than locations that did not have the commander's involvement.[49]

Talent management was then, and still remains a critical node in the execution of PSDR training. The October 24, 2005 memo, signed by VCSA General Cody, stated the HR community "has been professionalized through the merger of the human resources functional area (FA 43) and basic branch (BR42)."[50] However, this standalone statement was shown to be incorrect because recoding a Soldier's position alone did not professionalize the HR force.

This recoding expanded the HR officer profession while simultaneously integrating Adjutant General's Corps Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) on paper. However, in reality the HR community had untrained Soldiers at all levels, officer, warrant officer and enlisted. Initially BCTs deployed with the three key HR leaders in a brigade S-1 (the S-1 triad) having no experience other than the NOTT training, in the missions and functions they were about to be asked to perform. The senior HR professional in the triad was a FA 43 (Human Resource Management)[51] Major often

serving in his/her first HR management position. The Senior Noncommissioned Officer was often found serving outside the required skill set necessary to properly prepare for their new responsibility. In some cases the senior HR NCOs assigned to the brigade and battalion S1 sections were serving in MOS immaterial positions prior to the PSDR implementation or were serving as administrative specialists and did not have the technical breadth of experience to serve successfully as a brigade or battalion S-1 NCO.

The critical member of the S-1 triad remains the HR warrant officer. Initially under PSDR, warrant officer positions increased and grew the HR structure to support the brigade-centric structure requirements. However, this sudden increase in positions meant the Army became short of HR warrants to fill requirements. Although the Army ultimately increased HR warrant officer selections, many HR warrant officers, who theoretically were supposed to possess the most HR management expertise of the S-1 triad, had little to no experience to fill the HR positions to which they were assigned. It became clear the battalion and brigade S-1 triad was often unprepared because of a lack of knowledge, experience and technical training.

The result of having a combination of untrained or inexperienced HR leaders in the S-1 sections was devastating for the first few brigades that transitioned to using PSDR. As a result, engaged senior HR leaders at Division level acted using talent management concepts and reassigned HR leaders and Soldiers across supported units to close experience and training gaps. By using the talent management approach, HR leaders were able to assign trained and experienced HR leaders throughout units to develop other HR professionals and prepare units and Soldiers for deployment. Senior

HR leaders should maintain the ability to manage talent and develop HR professionals by balancing limited HR expertise and knowledge in BCT S-1s in the future.

Other positive impacts included the eventual conversion of MOS 71L (Administrative Specialist) to 42A (Human Resources Specialist). The MOS 42A conversion captured the required skills necessary to be successful in a PSDR organization. The Army grew warrant officer, Lieutenant and Captain Inventory to fill the authorizations within the first five years of PSDR implementation.

To capitalize on lessons learned, senior HR leaders initiated a talent management slating process that overcomes the need for units to balance the education, training and experience in the HR triad. The initiative involves the Adjutant General Branch at HRC, working in collaboration with the AGS to assign a trained HR triad of personnel to BCTs. The process is currently being formalized in a memorandum of agreement.[52] The proposed formal briefing is scheduled during the Career Management Field (CMF) review and will serve as a holistic HR management function for HR leadership at the BCT. This oversight and slating of the critical three HR leaders will mitigate the issue of an underdeveloped triad member being placed with two strong senior HR professionals.

An unintended consequence of PSDR was what the Commandant of the Adjutant General School calls "being everywhere and being nowhere at the same time."[53] The transformation to a brigade-centric force left brigade and battalion level HR professionals without senior HR mentorship. The result of the Army's transformation also moved HR technical skills formerly found in the PSBs to the Installation Management Agencies. This diversity and lack of one single HR point of contact

contributed to the decay of mentoring and professional development inside the HR community.

For example, the deactivation of the local Adjutant General's Corps Regimental Association (AGCRA) by a division G-1 is now seen as an error in managing training resources.[54] During deployments, local AGCRA chapters can provide professional development forums, mentorship and education and information sharing of HR initiatives. The use of the AGCRA, the *1775* magazine, the S-1 net, and senior leader visits could mitigate the technical and mentorship shortfalls associated with the reduced senior HR presence.

The collective training requirement gap is more uncertain, complex and ambiguous than the individual training gap. The AGS accurately identified this issue in the statement:

> Current operational conditions created a training gap that resulted in S-1 sections, Theater-level HR organizations, and installation MPDs that are not capable of providing continual comprehensive HR support to Commanders and Soldiers.[55]

The AGS further identified the three issues that negatively impacted collective and sustainment training as 1) operational conditions of the current level of persistent conflict, 2) no identified sustainment training program, and 3) no single organization to assess and train the HR force.[56] The AGS initially took an aggressive approach to resolving the collective and sustainment training issues by developing an HR Mobile Training Team (HR MTT) concept.[57] To support this concept, the school nested an issue statement within the Army G-1's list of top HR concerns for the Chief of Staff Army, and developed a bridging strategy and two courses of action.[58]

Regardless, each if the AGS's proposed concepts could achieve the collective training requirements of assessing, training and certifying the HR force by using an HR MTT.[59] Key differences of the two concepts simply concern identifying who or which organization should provide the resources and who should command and control the HR MTT's operation. In addition, the current Army structure does not take into account the strategic weight of the Human Capital Enterprise (HCE).[60] The current structure requires the Adjutant General School to coordinate the Programs of Instruction (POI), the Army Forces Command G-1 to link the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model to a training schedule, the Adjutant General of the Army to oversee development of HR databases to support training, and unit commanders to coordinate training resources and certification. Meanwhile, no single organization, HR or otherwise, is executing the command and control of the training and certification process.

A clearly defined command and control relationship starting with either the Army G-1 or a Human Capital Enterprise senior leader would provide the single command and control element needed to select and execute one of the proposed HR MTT concepts. This senior HR leader should also consider the integration of collective HR training and certification at the National Training Center, and the Joint Readiness Training Center for S-1 sections in BCTs and SRC-12 units. The integration of collective training and certification of the HR Company and the HRSC continues to work well during the Silver Scimitar and Silver Scimitar Light training events for many reasons. Initially Silver Scimitar, served as the certifying event for an HR unit to deploy to combat; today it also serves as an event for collaboration between the active, guard and reserve HR organizations.[61]

Other issues surrounding HR collective training are beyond the scope of this study. However, senior HR Leaders should present the AGS HR MTT concept to the Army G-1 as a feasible and suitable solution to the training gap issue identified by the Army G-1's (MG Bostick) report to the Chief of Staff of the Army.[62]

Together, the talent management of key leaders, improvements to the POIs, updated doctrine and the addition of critical HR courses turned the tide on HR individual training. Senior Army HR leaders must maintain the initiatives of the past four years because they are manpower and time sensitive and delays in updates will see individual HR training levels regress to the levels seen in 2005 and 2006.

Human Resources Doctrine

It is often thought doctrine is slow to evolve. However, in PSDR's case, Army changes in structure and training forced a comprehensive review and rewrite of HR doctrine in order to implement PSDR. Therefore, fifth and final area of assessment addresses the responses of the AGS and the Commandant of the Adjutant General's Corps. The AGS took aggressive actions to implement HR doctrinal changes and within four years, produced the first published version of FM 1-0, Human Resources Support. The newly written FM 1-0 successfully captured the new HR doctrine. In 2010, the AGS took lessons learned from the first three years of PSDR and published an updated FM 1-0. Simultaneously, the AGS captured lessons learned and revised each lesson plan and Program of Instruction (POI) for the Advanced Individual Training, Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course, and lieutenants and captains professional development schools. Each new POI took into account the CTSSB results and increased hands HR training.

As a result of requests from the field, the AGS added Human Resources

Management Qualification Course (HRMQC) to certify FA 43 officers from previous

operational branches.[63] The class was later expanded to accept senior NCOs and

warrant officers. In 2010, the HRMQC evolved into two classes. The first was a

Brigade S-1 Course, focusing on the technical HR skills needed for an officer, warrant

officer or senior NCO to serve as part of the brigade S-1 team. The second course, HR

Plans and Operations, was designed to train and educate new HR leaders on the skills

required in a Human Resources Operations Cell. Both classes integrated the doctrine

captured in the new FM 1-0 and involve hands on technical training identified as mission

critical during the CTSSB. To further drive home the importance of doctrine, the

Commandant of the Adjutant General's Corps continues to educate sustainment leaders

on HR doctrine during every welcome briefing to new classes at the AGS and the

sustainment pre-command courses.[64]

The Future of PSDR

Did the HR community get PSDR right? A simple one word response of yes or

no will not give justice to the question or the analysis of the implementation of PSDR.

An assessment by a FORSCOM HR leader stated, "bottom line is yes we did get PSDR

right, however, some improvements are needed in the areas of training, professional

development …knowledge of our doctrine."[65] A second summary of PSDR from another

officer stated,

> …applaud the strides PSDR has made….We have won back some
> credibility from the operational community….now is the perfect opportunity
> to reassess our SRC-12 units structure and tweak the structure.[66]

Together, the two comments indicate that the leaders who designed and

implemented PSDR achieved a functional but not completely effective redesign of the

personnel services support system. In order to improve on the initial PSDR successes, the HR community should continue to improve at writing and capturing after action reports and lessons learned. The HR community should sustain the level and frequency of doctrinal and training updates championed by the AGS. Individuals can remain innovative by providing ways to mitigate potential mentoring gaps through the AGCRA, S-1Net and other innovative means. Last, and most importantly, the HR community should identify a single decision maker to provide direction on the HR MTT concept and the potential restructuring of the SRC-12 assets.

The concept of PSDR as General Rochelle stated, is "a revolution in how we deliver support."[67] The PSDR concept was revolutionary. PSDR's implementation achieved the initial objectives of supporting a modular force. However, in order to achieve an optimal HR force, engaged strategic leaders must improve the first generation of PSDR and work to field the next generation of PSDR.

Endnotes

[1] United States Army Special Operations Command Home Page, http://www.soc.mil/ sofinfo/truths.html4 (accessed October 4, 2010).

[2] U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, "Theater HR Structure Orientation – Silver Scimitar 2008,"Briefing for HR Leadership at Silver Scimitar 2008, Fort Devens, MA, 2008.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, Michael Rochelle, "Personnel Services Delivery Redesign," memorandum for the Army Human Resources Community, Washington, DC, November 29, 2006.

[5] *S-1 Net Home Page,* https://forums.army.mil/secure/communitybrowser.aspx?id=166639 (accessed December 12, 2010).

[6] John A. Kaeo Mott, "*A centralized, web-based annual training and certification program for a decentralized Adjutant General Corps will improve the level of human resources proficiency for human resources professionals in the U.S. Active Army, U.S. Army Reserve and U.S.*

National Guard components," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2009-02), 1-16.

[7] In the summer of 2010 the Training and Doctrine Command approved the implementation of the HR Operations course. The first pilot course was conducted for students at the Adjutant General's School in the fall of 2010.

[8] E. Eric. Porter, Officer Professional Development commentary to Adjutant General Captains Career Course and Adjutant General Basic Officers Leaders Course, Fort Jackson, SC, Soldier Support Institute, Adjutant General's School, January 2010, and Sean Byrne, Officer Professional Development commentary to Adjutant General Captains Career Course, Fort Jackson, SC, Soldier Support Institute, Adjutant General's School, January 2010, and Gina S. Farrisee, Officer Professional Development commentary to Adjutant General Captains Career Course, Fort Jackson, SC, Soldiers Support Institute, Adjutant General's School, January 2010.

[9] Christopher R. Gosselin, "PSDR Lessons Learned Assessment-Final Assessment Report," Briefing slides, Concepts Development and Integrations Division, The Adjutant General Directorate, Human Resources Command, April 30, 2008.

[10] In the winter of 2010 the Adjutant General's School Commandant initiated communications with senior HR leaders requesting documentation of specific PSDR topics. The AGS Commandant's intent was to capture key lessons learned from senior leaders and published the documents for the professional development of the HR community.

[11] The commandant of the Adjutant General's School directed multiple 1775 articles be published to keep the HR force informed. In the Fall-Winter 2009 issue the theme of Army Bands Lessons Learned in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom was captured. In the Summer 2009 edition, officer and enlisted career progression under PSDR was discussed and in the Spring of 2010 the theme of "Transformation of the Army Reserve" was the main teaching point.

[12] CW5 Raymond M. Lutz, U.S. Army, Human Resources Sustainment Center, Kuwait, interview by author, October 28, 2010.

[13] Strep R. Kuehl, Robert L. Manning, Julie T. Manta, Michael E. Masley, Robert Ortiz-Abreu, Patrick M. Rice, Steven L. Shea, "PSDR Council of Colonels," teleconference commentary, Fort Jackson, SC, Soldier Support Institute, Adjutant General's School, December 7, 2010.

[14] Ibid.

[15] One of the four HR Core Competencies is to man the force as identified in the May 2010 version of FM1-0. The core competency is further broken into the elements of Personal Information Management (PIM), Strength Reporting (SR), Personnel Accounting (PA) and Personnel Readiness Management (PRM). Each element of the core competency is supported through an integrated network that allows for real-time updates to personal actions. PIM involves the collection, storage and displaying relevant HR information about units and personnel. SR is the action of turning the sum of by-name data into a number that accounts for the total population of an organization. PA is the by-name management of every person by duty

status and location. PRM results in an analysis of personnel strength data that provides capabilities and projections of capabilities from an HR perspective.

[16] The S-1 Net Homepage, https://forums.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id= 1134031&lang=en-US (accessed November 20, 2010).

[17] Kuehl et al., "PSDR Council of Colonels", and Dian Wandler, "Human Resources Company, OEF 2009-10: AAR and Key Lessons Learned," briefing slides with notes pages, Bamberg, Germany, April 6, 2010.

[18] Soldier Support Institute, "PSDR History," briefing slides, Fort Jackson, SC, Soldier Support Institute, Adjutant General's School, July 1, 2010.

[19] COL Steven Shea, U.S. Army, Human Resources Sustainment Center, Fort Bragg, Interviewed by author December 2010; CW5 Raymond M. Lutz, U.S. Army, Human Resources Sustainment Center, Kuwait, interview by author, October 28, 2010.

[20] CW5 Raymond M. Lutz, U.S. Army, Human Resources Sustainment Center, Kuwait, interview by author, October 28, 2010.

[21] COL John Sena, U.S. Special Operations Command CJ1, Tampa FL, interview by author December 2010.

[22] G-1,10th Mountain Division, *After Action Report: Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2008 – May 2009* (Fort Drum, NY: June 5, 2009), 3.

[23] Ibid., and Kuehl et al. "PSDR Council of Colonels".

[24] The S-1 Net Homepage, https://forums.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id= 1134031&lang=en-US (accessed November 20, 2010).

[25] Ibid.

[26] The Structure Requirement Code-12 (SRC-12) is a force management tool to track HR force structure. The SRC-12 includes the Human Resources Sustainment Center (HRSC), HR Company HQ, Personnel Accountability Team HQ (formally R5 HQ), Personnel Accountability Team (formally R5 Team), Theater Gateway PAT (formally Theater Gateway R5), Casualty Liaison Team, Casualty Platoon HQ, Postal Platoons, Military Mail Terminal (MMT) Team, and the HR Company Postal Plans and Operations Team.

[27] Shea, "U.S. Army, Human Resources Sustainment Center".

[28] BG Richard P. Mustion, U.S. Army, The Adjutant General, interview by author, February 18, 2011.

[29] The Commandant of the Adjutant General's School selected members for the Critical Task Sight Selection Board (CTSSB). Each board is responsible for the identification of valid individual critical tasks for a specific job or to identify a group of critical tasks, such as for an entire Military Occupational Specialty/Area of Concentration. To accomplish this task each

board and board member took into account the unit feedback, new doctrine, new or improved systems and equipment, documented lessons learned.

[30] L.Z. Harrison, "Recommendations of the Adjutant General Critical Task Site Selection Boards (CTSSBs)," briefing slides, Fort Jackson, SC, Soldier Support Institute, Adjutant General's School, April 29, 2010.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Robert Ortiz-Abreu, "Army HR Training Gap," briefing slides with notes, Fort Jackson, SC, Soldier Support Institute, August 6, 2010.

[33] Harrison, "Recommendations of the Adjutant General Critical Task Site Selection Boards (CTSSBs)".

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] The mission of the Personnel Services Battalion prior to the implementation of PSDR was to provide regional personnel and postal support. A Personnel Services Battalion would deploy a battalion task force in support of deployed Soldiers and provide critical personnel and postal support in an area of responsibility. Doctrinally, a PSB consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 2 - 4 Personnel Services Detachments (PSD) and a Postal Detachment. Rules of allocation provided one PSB for each division and one PSD for each maneuver brigade. The size of Personnel Services Battalions varied depending on the size of the geographic area and military and/or civilian personnel supported.

[40] U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7 LTG James J. Lovelace, "HQDA Warning Order for implementation of Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR),"order to HQ FORSCOM et al., Washington, DC. n.d.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] The S-1 Net Homepage, https://forums.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=1134031&lang=en-US (accessed November 20, 2010).

[48] Talent Management was initiated to cross level HR Soldiers and leaders with skills and experience into brigade S-1 sections. Due to the initial training gaps, MOS shortages, and the new doctrine many Soldiers did not have all the skills required to perform successfully. To mitigate the shortfalls, leaders distributed the talent across units.

[49] G-1,10th Mountain Division, *After Action Report: Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2008 – May 2009*, 1-2.

[50] U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff GEN Richard A. Cody, "Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR)," memorandum for the Army Staff, Washington, DC, October 24, 2005.

[51] The designation of a Functional Area 43 (FA 43) officer required no professional schooling at the implementation of PSDR. As more officers began to transition from basis branches to FA 43, the Adjutant General's School initiated a transition course in order to educate the officers with the HR skills required.

[52] COL Robert L. Manning, Commandant Adjutant General School, U.S. Army, Soldier Support Institute, interviewed by author, December 17, 2010

[53] Robert L. Manning, "Newcomers Welcome," comments to Adjutant General's Captains Career Courses and Adjutant General's Basic Officer Leaders Courses, Soldier Support Institute, Fort Jackson, SC, July 2008 to June 2009.

[54] G-1,10th Mountain Division, *After Action Report: Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2008 – May 2009*, 3.

[55] Ortiz-Abreu, "Army HR Training Gap", and Kuehl et al., "PSDR Council of Colonels".

[56] Ibid.

[57] The concept of a Human Resources Mobile Training Team (HR MTT) is a product of the work done in 2009 at the Adjutant General's School in collaboration with the Forces Command Staff, the Army G-1 Staff and The Adjutant General of the Army's office. Analysis showed that the New Organization Training Team (NOTT) was successful in the initial training of HR soldiers. However, the ability to conduct sustainment training was identified as a capability gap. To close the sustainment training gap the concept of a HR MTT was developed. The HR MTT concept gives senior HR leaders the capability to conduct sustainment training on the full range of HR tasks.

[58] Ortiz-Abreu, "Army HR Training Gap", and Kuehl et al., "PSDR Council of Colonels".

[59] Ibid.

[60] The Human Capital Enterprise (HCE) approach was initiated by the Army staff to capture the Army culture, systems, organizations, and processes that will result in a more effectively generated force. The HCE generated all volunteer force will be capable of conducting full spectrum operations in an era of persistent conflict in support of national interests.

[61] COL Steven Shea, U.S. Army, Human Resources Sustainment Center, Fort Bragg, Interviewed by author December 2010.

[62] Thomas P. Bostick, *Manning the Force during an Era of Persistent Conflict, CSA Task Force on Manning, 16 June 2009 – 4 September 2009*, Report to the Chef of Staff of the Army, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army),19.

[63] LTC Christopher Nichols, U.S. Army, Soldier Support Institute, interviewed by author, November 19, 2010.

[64] The Soldier Support Institute at Fort Jackson SC became integrated as a member of the sustainment community on October 1, 2009. The sustainment community consists of Quartermaster, Transportation, Ordinance, Finance and the Adjutant General Branches of the Army. Pre-Command classes are required for the LTC and COL level commanders assuming command in the sustainment community.

[65] PSDR Working Group Two, "Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) - Did we (the AG corps) get it right?," briefing slides, Fort McPherson, GA, Forces Command, August 19, 2009

[66] Angie K. Holbrook, *An HR Leader's perspective on PSDR five years later: Did the implementation of PSDR achieve its intended end state?,* After Action Report presented to the Human Resources Command (Fort Knox, KY: Soldier Support Branch, Human Resources Command, November 4, 2010), 3.

[67] U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-1 LTG Michael D. Rochelle, "Personnel Services Delivery redesign (PSDR)," memorandum for The Army Human Resources Community, Washington, DC, November 29, 2006.